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FEW ENTERPRISES HAVE LEFT more monuments on O'ahu than did
the Army's Coast Artillery Corps. When the Army inactivated the
Corps in 1950, O'ahu was left with numerous concrete structures
scattered about reservations known as Forts Ruger, DeRussy, Arm-
strong, Kamehameha, Weaver, Barrette, and Hase, along with obser-
vation posts and remnants of gun and searchlight emplacements in
the heights of the Wai'anae and Ko'olau mountain ranges. The names
of the forts survive and numerous of the concrete structures attract
the attention of the inquisitive. This is the history of how some of the
more unusual of these artifacts came to be.
High-powered, rifled naval guns rendered masonry harbor-
defense forts impotent during the Civil War. The Army saw dire im-
plications in the ease with which Fort Pulaski, at the mouth of the
Savannah River, was reduced by rifled cannon. Harbor-defense forts
consisting of tier on tier of smooth-bore cannon emplaced within brick
casemates1 were clearly obsolete.
Nevertheless, the nation grew complacent following the end of the
Civil War and little was done to strengthen seacoast fortifications
until President Grover Cleveland took office in 1885. Congress was
determined to upgrade seacoast defenses because of a perceived threat
of European maritime powers. Following a congressional act making
appropriations for fortifications, President Cleveland directed Secre-
William H. Dorrance, Sc.D., served as an Army officer during World War II and a reserve
Air Force officer until retirement. He is a feature writer forWindward Oahu News and a
contributor to historical journals.
The Hawaiian Journal of History, vol. 29 (1995)
147
1 4 8 THE HAWAIIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY
tary of War William C. Endicott to convene a board to "examine and
report at what ports fortifications or other defenses are most urgently
required, the character and kind of defenses best adapted for
each. . . ."2
The Endicott Board's report was submitted to Congress in January
1886. Construction of more than seventy upgraded harbor-defense
forts followed in the next twenty-eight years. The new harbor de-
fenses would consist of dispersed batteries of large-caliber mortars,3
large-caliber guns, most of which were mounted on disappearing car-
riages,4 and fields of submarine mines "planted" in harbor mouths by
the Army in times of threat. Small-caliber, rapid-fire guns would pro-
tect the mine fields from intruders.
It was a lethal combination. The lofted mortar projectiles threat-
ened the armored decks of the naval vessels of the day. The large-
caliber guns threatened the armored sides, and the submarine mines
put the lightly armored bottoms at risk. No admiral would attempt to
run into, or anchor in the vicinity of, any harbor so defended.
Following the Spanish-American War of 1898, Puerto Rico, the Phil-
ippines, and the Hawaiian Islands became possessions of the United
States. When President Theodore Roosevelt took office, he saw that sci-
entific advances made possible improvements in Endicott Board-
inspired harbor defenses, and that suitable defenses were required for
harbors located within the "insular possessions." In January 1905 he
instructed Secretary of War William H. Taft to convene the National
Coast Defense Board (Taft Board) "to consider and report upon the
coast defenses of the United States and the insular possessions."5
The Taft Board report was submitted by President Roosevelt to the
Congress in March 1906. The board recommended that O'ahu's
defenses consist of fortifications that defended Honolulu Harbor and
Pearl Harbor. The recommendations were refined by a joint Army
and Navy board in 1908, and the harbor defense buildup on O'ahu
followed the refinements until the onset of World War I.6
In 1908 the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was in the midst of con-
structing O'ahu fortifications in accordance with the recommenda-
tions of the joint board. Plans called for the emplacement of a battery
of 3-inch guns to protect a submarine mine field that, in times of war,
would be planted in the entrance to Honolulu Harbor; a battery of
eight 12-inch mortars to protect each harbor; batteries of two 6-inch
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disappearing rifles and two 14-inch disappearing rifles to protect
Honolulu Harbor; and a battery of two 12-inch disappearing rifles to
protect Pearl Harbor.
These weapons were to be emplaced within military reservations
that were eventually named Forts Armstrong, Kamehameha, DeRussy,
and Ruger. The origins of these names are shown in Table 1. Forts
were named for deceased persons who had rendered service to the
U.S. government or had otherwise distinguished themselves, and gun
batteries were named for deceased Army officers who had rendered
distinguished service. The allocation, battery names, and construc-
tion commencement dates of the pre-1910 emplacements are given in
Table 2.
The forts and battery emplacements were constructed according
to the concepts of the times.7 The batteries were dispersed for con-
cealment and to insure that a projectile striking one would not there-
by endanger a neighbor. They were open to the rear to facilitate
ammunition service at a rapid rate.
The mortars were emplaced four to a pit and were secure when
exposed to the flat naval fire of the time. The 6-inch, 12-inch, and
14-inch guns were mounted on disappearing carriages that remained
concealed behind a frontal parapet until elevated to fire.
When the Endicott Board submitted its report in 1886 the nation
was confident that no enemy would attempt to land a force at loca-
tions other than at developed seaports with their convenient disem-
barking wharves. It was believed that the standing Regular Army and
a large militia, much of it composed of blooded Civil War veterans,
would meet and defeat any enemy attempting to land elsewhere.
Land defense of the new fortifications received scant attention until a
War College study of 1905—1906 pointed to the vulnerability of the
forts to attacks from the rear.8
During the Spanish-American War, sixteen regiments were found
necessary to defend the east coast of the United States alone.9 From
this, it was clear that the nation's land army was inadequate to the
task when both coasts were threatened. An enemy could land a force
at a location of its choosing and take harbor-defense forts from the
rear. Once the forts were taken, the enemy vessels could use the har-
bors as disembarkation points with impunity, and the main purpose
of the harbor-defense forts would be defeated.
TABLE I
ORIGIN OF NAMES OF O'AHU
PRE-WORLD WAR II FORTS AND BATTERIES
FORT/BATTERY
Ruger/
Birkhimer
Harlow
Hulings
Dodge
Mills
DeRussy/
Randolph
Dudley
Armstrong/
Tiernon
Kamehameha/
Hasbrouck
Selfridge
Jackson
Barri
Chandler
Adair
Boyd
Closson
Weaver/
Williston
Barrette/
Hatch
NAMED FOR
Maj. Gen. Thomas E.
Brig. Gen. William E.
Maj. Frank S.
Col. Thomas M.
Maj. Theodore A.
Col. Stephen C.
Bvt. Brig. Gen. Rene Edward
Maj. Benjamin H.
Brig. Gen. Edgar S.
Brvt. Brig. Gen. Samuel C.
Brig. Gen. John L.
Kamehameha I
Brig. Gen. Henry C.
1st Lt. Thomas C.
Brig. Gen. Richard Henry
Capt. Thomas O.
2d Lt. Rex
lstLt. Henry R.
Capt. Charles T.
Brig. Gen. Henry W.
Brig. Gen. Erasmus M.
Brig. Gen. Edward R.
Brig. Gen. John D.
Brig. Gen. Henry J.
YEAR OF
DEATH
1907
1914
1906
1864
1909
1914
1907
1907
1911
1892
1910
1819
1910
1908
1892
1863
1913
1916
1916
1917
1920
1920
1934
1931
GENERAL
ORDER
NO.; YEAR
15; 1909
15; 1916
15; 1909
36; 1915
36; 1915
36; 1915
15; 1909
15; 1909
59; 1911
160; 1909
59; 1911
245; 1909
59; 1911
15; 1909
72; 1913
36; 1915
36; 1915
13; 1917
13; 1917
13; 1922
13; 1922
13; 1922
10; 1934
10; 1934
Note: This list of the origins of the names of the forts and batteries was
compiled by Alvin H. Grobmeier from the Army Headquarters listing of
General Orders and from various listings in the Official Army Register.
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TABLE 2
HARBOR DEFENSE FORTS AND BATTERIES
(BATTERIES COMMENCED BEFORE 1910 FISCAL YEAR)
FORT BATTERY NUMBER OF CALIBER COMMENCEMENT
CANNON DATEa
Ruger Harlow eight 12-inch April 1907
mortars
Kamehameha Selfridge two 12-inch November 1907
Hasbrouck eight 12-inch July 1909
mortars
DeRussy Randolph two 14-inch December 1908
Dudley two 6-inch July 1909
Armstrong Tiernon two 3-inch April 1909
aThe Corps of Engineers published a "Report of Completed Works"
upon completion of each battery. The commencement dates used here
were taken from the form 1 for each battery. These forms are found in
National Archives Record Group 77 (Records of the Office of the Chief
of Engineers). Forts Weaver, Barrette, and Hase and several batteries
were constructed after 1910.
It didn't help that the emplacements of the largest caliber guns
limited their traverse to 170 degrees.10 This resulted because the pro-
tective parapets were so close to the gun mounts that when the guns
were pointed to the rear there would be insufficient room to accom-
modate the recoil when the guns were fired. The gun mounts and
emplacements were designed to protect the guns from frontal naval
fire at a sacrifice of a 360-degree field of fire.
Following the War College study of 1905—1906, the acting chief of
artillery, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Murray,11 recommended that a
group of officers be detailed to study the problem of "protection of
seacoast forts from attack by land." War Department Special Order
No. 64, March 18, 1907, followed Colonel Murray's recommenda-
tions. What was later named the National Land Defense Board con-
sisted of four officers, including Captain William G. Haan.12
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Pinch point
Pinch point
FIG. I. Location of harbor-defense forts and pinch points cited by Major William
G. Haan in his May 15, 1908, report to the National Land Defense Board.
(W. H. Dorrance.)
In 1908 newly promoted Major Haan visited O'ahu to carry out
the board's assignment.13 The Army was in the midst of fortifying the
approaches to Honolulu Harbor and Pearl Harbor, and it was Haan's
assignment to identify the proper land defenses to protect the fortifi-
cations.
As Haan observed, O'ahu's situation was unique. A large segment
of the population was Japanese, thought to be a domestic problem
should future hostilities involve Japan as an enemy.14 He concluded
that at least one infantry regiment must be permanently garrisoned
on the island to deal with attacks by the local population and addi-
tional regiments were required to oppose landings on the north shore
or elsewhere.15
Haan's recommendations that defenses against hostile landings on
the relatively open north shore and the eastern and western flanks of
the island be vested in a garrison of infantry eventually resulted in
the location of an army division at Schofield Barracks.
Further, Haan's recommendation that landings on the mountain-
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ous east or west coasts be sealed off at narrow shoreline pinch points
rather than being met with fixed fortifications along these coasts was
also accepted. He also recommended that an ordnance depot be
established and the island be carefully mapped to a fine scale. The
War Department sent Haan's report to the War College Division for
review.16
Several reviews and iterations of land defense plans for O'ahu en-
sued. In 1910 Brigadier General Murray, chief of Coast Artillery,
objected to Haan's plan as promulgated by the War Department. He
had visited O'ahu in 1909 and concluded that the enemy should be
kept off the island at all costs no matter where he chose to land.
Murray proposed to accomplish this by installing an additional five
to seven mortar batteries of four 12-inch mortars each at suitable
intervals around the island. General Murray also urged that the Navy
Department's cooperation be sought to determine where along the
coastline such landings might be attempted.17
The War Department and Navy Department conducted a joint
survey of the island in 1911.18 Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
Fleet Admiral Chauncey Thomas; the commanding general of the
California Department, now Major General Murray; and the com-
manding general of the Honolulu District, Brigadier General Mont-
gomery M. Macomb,19 conducted around-the-island inspections, first
by boat and then by automobile.
General Murray won Admiral Thomas over to his view of the situa-
tion, and Thomas endorsed the idea of installing seven new 12-inch
mortar batteries around the island.20
The War Department faced a dilemma. On the one hand, Major
Haan's report had been reviewed by a War College committee and
endorsed by the chief of staff. On the other hand, respected senior
officers, General Murray and Admiral Thomas, disagreed with Haan's
report and urged that seven new mortar batteries be distributed
around the O'ahu coastline to keep the enemy off the island.
On January 31, 1912, the War College recommended to the chief
of staff that "a study of the military problem of Oahu" be performed
to resolve the question of land defenses once and for all.21 The secre-
tary of war concurred, and the Board to Study and Report upon the
Defenses of Oahu (Macomb Board) was appointed shortly thereafter.
The Macomb Board convened in Honolulu on July 12, 1912, and
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was chaired by General Macomb. The board made its report to the
War Department on September 6, 1912, and subsequent appropria-
tions requests reflected the board's recommendations.
The seven mortar batteries proposed by Murray and Thomas were
not included in the board's recommendations, and Major Haan's
assertion that landings on the eastern and western shores should be
sealed off at "pinch points" was seconded.
In 1912 the Army was in a poor position to cover O'ahu's pinch
points with mobile artillery because of a shortage of appropriate artil-
lery pieces. The Army's Watervliet Arsenal gun factory had concen-
trated on fabrication of large-caliber coastal-defense cannon to the
detriment of producing the mobile howitzers and guns that land-
defense forces would require. By the end of 1914, for example, the
Army's thirty-six four-gun batteries of field artillery possessed no
more than eighty-eight mobile 4.7-inch guns and howitzers.22 It could
be expected that the land defenses would be built around the use of
stationary gun emplacements because it was the only option available
at the time.
The Army Ordnance Department improvised as best it could.
Some 4.7-inch and 6-inch guns resulting from orders placed with
the English W. G. Armstrong works during the Spanish-American
War were removed from their seacoast defense emplacements and
sent to O'ahu. Also, there were two 5-inch guns available that came
from an inactivated Delaware River battery.23 These guns were to
be emplaced in casemated works at locations selected by the Ma-
comb Board and its following review board. In addition, the Ord-
nance Department developed a high-explosive projectile for the
12-inch mortars, a few of which were available for land defense.24
Until then, all projectiles supplied for the seacoast mortars were
thick-skinned deck-piercing rounds not conducive to producing
shrapnel.
Six rapid-firing six-pounder guns were made available (later in-
creased to twelve).
O'ahu's land-defense emplacements were to be unique. Two 4.7-
inch gun batteries were to be tunneled into the rim of Diamond
Head crater positioned to sweep the beaches north of Diamond
Head. The six rapid-fire 6-pounder guns were emplaced on the
crater's rim pointed in the same direction. Two batteries were to be
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FIG. 2. Northeast tip of Ford Island circa 1917 showing two armed casemates of Battery
Adair. The narrow-gauge railroad pier was used to load the sugarcane harvests onto
barges that transported the cane to a railhead on Waipio Peninsula. (National Archives
NA 38-FCD-35.)
emplaced on Ford Island, one at the northern edge and the other on
the western side of the island. These batteries would protect Fort
Kamehameha. Other batteries were to sweep the Ewa plain and cover
the Waipio Peninsula. A mortar battery was to be constructed inside
Diamond Head crater and with the 360-degree traverse of the mor-
tars would keep a radius of nine miles within their field of fire.
Except for the mortar battery, all batteries were to be casemated with
reinforced concrete and a cover of earth.
The gun emplacements were supplemented with six strategically
placed searchlights, a redoubt on Red Hill anchoring the north end
of the western line, and certain ditches.
Except for 3-inch gun Battery Edwards at Fort Mott, the new bat-
teries would be the first casemated batteries constructed by the engi-
neers in the post-Civil War era. Colonel Edward Burr, assistant to the
chief engineer,25 explained: "This armament is of the coast defense
type and for land defense purposes it requires emplacements designed
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TABLE 3
O'AHU LAND DEFENSES, 1914-1920 ERA
BATTERY LOCATION CONSTRUCTION ARMAMENT FIELD OF
STARTED FIRE
Mills Black Point Aug. 1914 two 5-inch Wai'alae
District
Barri Bishop's Sept. 1914 two 4.7-inch Ewa Beach
Point
Chandler Bishop's Sept. 1914 two 3-inch Waipio
Point Peninsula
Hulings Diamond Sept. 1914 two 4.7-inch North to
Head Koko Head
Dodge Diamond Sept. 1914 two 4.7-inch North to
Head Koko Head
Birkhimer Diamond June 1915 four mortars 360 degrees
Head
Adair N.E. Ford Is. Aug. 1916 two 6-inch Pualoa
Plain
Boyd W. Ford Is. Aug. 1916 two 6-inch Ewa Plain
to furnish protection from overhead and flank fire such is not con-
templated in coast defense design. . . ,"26
The emplacements listed in Table 3 were approved and appropria-
tions made for them by the Congress.
When the fields of fire for these batteries are overlaid on a map of
southern O'ahu it is clear that the fields overlap and Major Haan's
"pinch points" are covered. A protected citadel encompassing the
anchorage and naval base at Pearl Harbor, metropolitan Honolulu,
and all coastal defense forts was created. Attacks from the ocean
would be met by the harbor-defense cannon.
These improvisations were doomed to be short-lived because of
fast-moving events elsewhere. Long before the United States entered
World War I in April 1917, the British Navy had met and defeated the
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Ewa
Plain
Honolulu
U.S. Navy Base
Fort Kamehameha
Pacific Ocean
FIG. 3. Location of Batteries Boyd and Adair on Ford Island showing relation of
gun directrixes to the naval base, Honolulu city, and Fort Kamehameha. The
island was leased to the Oahu Sugar Company and planted in sugarcane
through 1918. (W. H. Dorrance.)
Imperial German Navy in epic battles near the Falkland Islands and
at Dogger's Bank in the North Sea.27
Long-range fire using elevated large-caliber guns carried the day
in these battles. From this it became clear that the concept of the dis-
appearing gun carriage was obsolete because it limited gun elevation
angles to twenty degrees or less. Long-range fire requires elevation
angles much higher than that possible with disappearing carriages
with their complicated linkages.
Further, the enemy's long-range projectiles would descend at an
angle such as to render the protecting frontal parapet useless. The
day of the disappearing gun emplacements had passed, and the
nation's harbor defenses were again obsolete.
Responding to the concerns of Congress about this development,
on March 10, 1915, Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison convened
the Board of Review to study and recommend "as to the need of sea-
coast defenses" in the wake of overseas developments. The board
made its report on November 26, 1915, with far-reaching conse-
quences. According to the board, the new weapons should include
12-inch and 16-inch guns capable of high-angle fire and antiaircraft
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guns to meet the new threat of airplanes. Explicit recommendations
for O'ahu included:
six 12-inch guns mounted for long range fire—to cover water areas not
covered by existing armament from which the naval utilities [i.e., the
base at Pearl Harbor] can be bombarded by a hostile naval force, and
to afford a means of defense against hostile warships attempting to support
landings on the island.28 (emphasis added)
Fortunately, the Ordnance Department had developed a barbette
carriage for the 12-inch gun that made possible high gun elevations
and 360-degree traverse. With a new 975-pound projectile and an
elevation angle of thirty-five degrees, the 12-inch gun had a maxi-
mum range of 30,100 yards (17 miles).
In 1920 two of the 12-inch guns were emplaced in the Fort Kame-
hameha reservation and subsequently named Battery Closson. When
this battery was emplaced, the earlier land-defense guns were out-
reached and rendered obsolete. The 360-degree traverse capability
allowed Battery Closson's guns to discharge both harbor-defense and
land-defense missions. The curious episode of employing casemated
seacoast defense cannon as land-defense batteries was coming to
an end.
By 1925 the fixed land-defense batteries were disarmed or as-
signed other functions. The 4.7-inch guns were removed from Batter-
ies Barri, Hulings, and Dodge. Battery Birkhimer (four 12-inch
mortars) was found to be too cramped and poorly designed. The bat-
tery was extensively rebuilt and subsequently listed as a harbor-
defense battery.
Batteries Mills, Adair, and Boyd were disarmed. Battery Chandler's
3-inch guns were designated as spares for Batteries Tiernan at Fort
Armstrong and Hawkins at Fort Kamehameha.
Nothing remains today of Batteries Mills, Barri, and Chandler. Bat-
teries Hulings and Dodge are sealed off but remain intact, without
guns, tunneled into the rim of Diamond Head Crater. The two 4.7-
inch Armstrong guns of Battery Dodge are mounted on concrete
pedestals in front of the Hawaii National Guard Armory located in
Wahiawa at the south border of Wheeler Field. The original pit of
Battery Birkhimer has been covered over and serves as the headquar-
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FIG. 4. A 12-inch gun of Battery Closson. Two of these guns were emplaced in 1920
within the Fort Kamehameha reservation. Full-caliber practice firings of all seacoast
batteries were limited to once a year to conserve ammunition and limit disturbance of
the surrounding communities. (15th Air Base Wing Historian's Office)
ters for the State of Hawai'i's Department of Defense, Office of Civil
Defense.
Batteries Adair and Boyd survive without guns. Battery Boyd is
used for storage by the Navy, and Battery Adair is incorporated in the
foundation of a flag officer's residence.
NOTES
1
 A casemate is a bombproof chamber in a fort in which cannon are mounted to
be fired through openings facing the enemy, called embrasures.
2
 U.S. House of Representatives, Report of the Board of Fortifications Appointed Under
the Provisions of the Act of Congress Approved March 3, 1885, Executive Document
49, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., Serial 2395, "Endicott Board Report" 5.
3
 The Army divides cannon into three categories: mortars, howitzers, and guns.
A mortar has a short barrel and is fired on a steeply elevated trajectory. Its pro-
jectile descends almost vertically. A howitzer has a longer barrel and is fired on
l 6 o THE HAWAIIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY
a less elevated trajectory but elevated enough that it can reach targets hidden
from flat-trajectory guns. A gun has the longest barrel and, except for antiair-
craft work, is fired on a relatively flat trajectory.
4
 The disappearing gun carriages employed a heavy counterweight to raise the
guns to firing position. When the gun was fired, the recoil of the gun caused it
to pivot backwards and down to the loading position. Latches held the guns in
the recoiled position for loading.
5
 U.S. Senate, Coast Defenses of the United States and the Insular Possessions, Senate
Document 249, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 Mar. 1906, "Taft Board Report" 5. See
also William H. Dorrance, Fort Kamehameha: The Story of the Harbor Defenses of
Pearl Harbor (Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Publishing Co., 1993).
6
 Major Arthur S. Conklin, Historical Sketch of the Defenses of Oahu by the United
States (rpt. Honolulu: U.S. Army, March 1913) 6, 7.
7
 Col. Eben Eveleth Winslow, Notes on Seacoast Fortification Construction. Occa-
sional Papers, no. 61, U.S. Army Engineer School (rpt. Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1920).
8
 Lt. Col. William G. Haan, "What Has Been Done Since 1892 For The Defense
of Our Coast Line Outside The Coast Forts," Journal of the United States Artillery
39.2 (March-April 1913): 132, 133.
9
 Haan, "What Has Been Done" 131.
10 War Department, Instructions for Mounting, Using and Caring for Disappearing Car-
riages for 14-Inch Guns. Ordnance Department Report 1712 (rpt. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1917) 7 and drawing no. 11—5—1.
11
 Arthur Murray graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point with
the class of 1874 ranked second. He served as chief of artillery, then chief of
coast artillery (1907) from 1906 to 1911. He commanded the Western Depart-
ment of the Army from 1911 to 1915 and, recalled from retirement, from
1917 to 1918. He received the Distinguished Service Medal for his last assign-
ment. He permanently retired in 1918 and died at Washington, D.C., 12 May
1925 at the age of seventy-four. Bvt. Major General George W. Cullum, Bio-
graphical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy at West
Point (New York: Seemans & Peters, Printers, Saginaw, Michigan) vol. VIA, 189;
vol. VII, 120.
12
 William G. Haan graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point with
the class of 1889 ranked twelfth. After serving at numerous coast artillery com-
mands, during World War I he commanded the Thirty-Second Division of the
American Expeditionary Force, for which he was awarded the Distinguished
Service Medal. Major General Haan retired 31 Mar. 1922 and died at Washing-
ton, D.C., 26 Oct. 1924 at the age of sixty-one. Cullum, Biographical Register \o\.
VIA, 514-15; vol. VII, 283.
13
 Conklin, Historical Sketch 8—11.
14
 In 1908, during Major Haan's visit, there were seven major sugar plantations
on O'ahu. A June 1901 compilation listed 6,364 Japanese sugar workers on
O'ahu of a total population of 58,504. An 1896 census gave a total of 109,020
residents in Hawai'i of whom 22,329 were Japanese. HAA 1902: 38, 39.
LAND DEFENSES OF O'AHU'S FORTS l 6 l
15
 Conklin, Historical Sketch g, 10.
16
 Conklin, Historical Sketch 11, 12.
17
 Conklin, Historical Sketch 13—16.
18
 Conklin, Historical Sketch 20—23.
19
 Montgomery M. Macomb graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West
Point with the class of 1874 ranked fourth. Between January 1911 and March
1914 he commanded, successively, the Department of Hawai'i, the Hawai'i
Department, and the First Hawaiian Brigade. Following his Hawai'i duty, he
served as president of the Army War College in Washington before retirement
as a brigadier general in October 1916. Macomb died at New York on 19 Jan.
1924 at the age of seventy-seven. Cullum, Biographical Register, vol. VIA, 189-90;
vol. VII, 120.
20
 Conkl in , Historical Sketch 2 0 - 2 2 .
21
 Conkl in , Historical Sketch 30 .
22
 U.S. Army C e n t e r of Military History, Order of Battle of the United States Land
Forces in the World War (Washington: U.S. Army C e n t e r of Military History,
1988 ) , vol. 3 , pt . 1, 202 . See also Watervl iet Arsenal , A History of Watervliet Arse-
nal 1813 to Modernization 1982 ( rpt . Watervliet , N.Y.: U.S. Army Watervl ie t Arse-
nal, 1982) 96.
23
 Capt. Douglas MacArthur, Memorandum for the chief of staff, Washington,
D.C., 19 Dec. 1913, 10. Records of the Office of the Adjutant General,
National Archives.
24
 Conkl in , Historical Sketch 15.
25
 Edward Burr graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point ranked
first in the class of 1882. From 26 May 1910 to 25 Sept. 1914 he served in
Washington as assistant to the chief engineer, being promoted to colonel on 2
Mar. 1912. Burr was honorably discharged as brigadier general, National Army,
on 5 Feb. 1919 and was promoted to brigadier general, Regular Army, in retire-
ment in May 1930. Cullum, Biographical Register, Vol. VIA, 330; vol. VIII, 63.
26
 MacArthur, Memorandum, g, 10.
27
 Wil l iam Hovgaa rd , Modern History of Warships (Annapol i s : U n i t e d States Naval
Institute, 1971) 222-23, 233-36. The Falklands battle took place 8 Dec. 1914,
and the battle at Dogger's Bank occurred 24 Jan. 1915.
28 War D e p a r t m e n t , Report of the Board of Review of the War Department ( rpt . Wash-
ington: Government Printing Office, igi6) 5.

